After the collapse of d étente in the late 1970s, many conservatives called for the Reagan administration to roll back communism in Europe and especially in Latin America. THE REAGAN AND SECOND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONSĭespite the absence of a positive theory of a Communist rollback for much of the cold war, the idea did not die. Thereafter, the world ’s dominoes were seen as leaning against the United States from the 1950s through the 1970s. The Soviets ’ continued de facto and then de jure domination of Central and Eastern Europe frustrated those early reactionary impulses to roll back the postwar status quo. If that policy was successful, it was hoped that it might set into motion a counterdomino effect in which European Soviet-styled authoritarian regimes were felled by a mix of domestic and Western pressure. Although the lexicon of falling dominoes had not been coined yet, the basic logic was the same: It was hoped that American successes would demonstrate the power of the West and the poverty of the Soviet alternative. Soon after the end of the World War II (1939 –1945) conservatives in the Truman administration advocated “rolling back ” Soviet advances in Europe. On both counts American decision makers feared that seemingly small reverses in peripheral countries ultimately would lead to a massive redistribution of cold war power as country after country fell to Communist pressure.Īlthough the rhetoric of falling dominoes most often was used to articulate the dangers from the unchecked spread of Soviet expansion, some noted that dominoes might be induced to fall the other way as well. In that case the insecurities of allied countries and the demonstrated inability or unwillingness of the United States to help overcome them would lead countries to pull away from the United States. Second, that perception of threat was amplified by concerns that the inability of an American-sponsored government to suppress domestic insurgents or outside provocateurs would signal that the United States could not be counted on as a reliable alliance partner. Communist success would breed success, and failure to stem the tide early would push countries out of the American orbit, with disastrous longterm consequences. The first was that if the United States failed to support an ally against Communist agitation, Communist movements in neighboring countries and their Soviet and Chinese sponsors would be emboldened. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson continued to believe that setbacks in southeastern Asia in general and Vietnam in particular would have dire consequences.įears of dominoes falling were based primarily on two mutually reinforcing concerns. After the Eisenhower administration, the Democratic administrations of John F. The growing momentum of communism and the falling of dominoes animated national security debates over American policies toward Western Europe and Latin America as well. The application of the domino theory, however, was not limited to southeastern Asia. Of particular concern to American leaders at that time was the ongoing crisis in southeastern Asia, where the loss of Vietnam could be expected to lead to eventual Communist domination of Thailand, Indonesia, and perhaps New Zealand and Australia (Gaddis 1982). According to that principle, a change in one country will “spill over, ” setting in motion the political transformation of an entire region. So you have the beginning of a disintegration that would have profound influences ” (Eisenhower 1954, p. you have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. DOMINO THEORY DEFINITION FREEEisenhower in an April 7, 1954, news conference in which he worried that if communism remained unchecked, the free world might endure “the ‘falling domino ’ principle. The domino theory was articulated by President Dwight D. THE REAGAN AND SECOND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS
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